From 5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 18:24:12 -0800 Subject: Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use. - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs. - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers. Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers. - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns. - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on boot. - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan. - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack. - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers. Protocols: - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB). - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range on socket by socket basis. - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used. - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path manager. - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4). - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986). - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters. - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154. - Remove static WEP support. - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate reporting. - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP). BPF: - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure" precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type. - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and timestamp metadata. - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect metadata. - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks. - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and bpf_trace_vprintk helpers. - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case. - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by livepatch and BPF. - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in different time intervals. - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64. - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC. - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs. - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF memory accounting for container environments. Netfilter: - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band /proc interface installed by this target. - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist. Driver API: - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right IRQ affinity on AMD platforms. - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly. - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress. - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA) Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of shared medium Ethernet. - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames. - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET. - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and factor out common parts of netlink operation handling. - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers). - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning messages with notifications for debug. - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct. - Add support for per action HW stats in TC. - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from a specific point in the action chain). - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to using nl80211 interface instead. - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling, including the definition of a new default value that will benefit CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance. New hardware / drivers: - Ethernet: - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver) - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA) - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP) - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux - WiFi: - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu) - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k) - CAN: - Renesas R-Car V4H Drivers: - Bluetooth: - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers. - Ethernet NICs: - Intel (1G, igc): - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model - Intel (100G, ice): - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY - multi-buffer XDP support - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices - nVidia/Mellanox: - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload - more efficient crypto key management method - multi-port eswitch support - Netronome/Corigine: - add DCB IEEE support - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800 - Freescale/NXP (enetc): - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle - support MAC Merge layer - Other NICs: - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100 - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO) - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G - cpts: support pulse-per-second output - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff - tsnep: XDP support - Ethernet high-speed switches: - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw): - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages) - Microchip (sparx5): - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make the implicit rules always active - add support for egress DSCP rewrite - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification) - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS etc.) - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control) - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q, 8.6.5.1) - Ethernet embedded switches: - Marvell (mv88e6xxx): - add MAB (port auth) offload support - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390 - NXP (ocelot): - support MAC Merge layer - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys - Microchip: - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet - other: - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi): - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the BIOS to the firmware. - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k): - IPQ5018 support - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support - channel 177 support - MediaTek WiFi (mt76): - per-PHY LED support - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support - switch to using page pool allocator - RealTek WiFi (rtw89): - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance - Mobile: - rmnet: support TX aggregation" * tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits) page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp(). ... --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c | 483 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 483 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c') diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f56fa94ff --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */ + +#include "ice_common.h" +#include "ice_vf_mbx.h" + +/** + * ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * @vfid: VF ID to send msg + * @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication + * @v_retval: return error code + * @msg: pointer to the msg buffer + * @msglen: msg length + * @cd: pointer to command details + * + * Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox + * queue and asynchronously sending message via + * ice_sq_send_cmd() function + */ +int +ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval, + u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd) +{ + struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd; + struct ice_aq_desc desc; + + ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf); + + cmd = &desc.params.virt; + cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid); + + desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode); + desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval); + + if (msglen) + desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD); + + return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd); +} + +static const u32 ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[] = { + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB, /* BIT(0) */ + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB, +}; + +/** + * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl + * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed + * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted + * + * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl. + * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return + * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller + * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where + * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can + * expect the speed in Mbps. + */ +u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed) +{ + /* convert a BIT() value into an array index */ + u32 index = fls(link_speed) - 1; + + if (adv_link_support) + return ice_get_link_speed(index); + else if (index < ARRAY_SIZE(ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed)) + /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in + * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF + * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are + * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds + */ + return ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[index]; + + return VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN; +} + +/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there + * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the + * PF. + * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during + * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot(). + * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of + * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF. + * + * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an + * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before + * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This can be + * done via ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(). + * + * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must + * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). + * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is + * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm. + * + * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a VFId is received which + * is passed to the state handler. The boolean output is_malvf of the state + * handler ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the caller + * whether this VF is malicious or not. + * + * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message + * to the system administrator. The caller can invoke ice_mbx_report_malvf() + * to help determine if a malicious VF is to be reported or not. This function + * requires the caller to maintain a global bitmap to track all malicious VFs + * and pass that to ice_mbx_report_malvf() along with the VFID which was identified + * to be malicious by ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). + * + * 6. The global bitmap maintained by PF can be cleared completely if PF is in + * reset or the bit corresponding to a VF can be cleared if that VF is in reset. + * When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we assume that the new VF + * brought up is not malicious and hence report it if found malicious. + * + * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information + * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled. + * + * 8. The memory allocated for variables in ice_mbx_snapshot is de-allocated + * when driver is unloaded. + */ +#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M) +/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that + * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm + */ +#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF + +/** + * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @new_state: new algorithm state + * + * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking + * for malicious VFs. + */ +static void +ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, + enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; + u32 num_iterations; + + snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf; + + /* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask + * on the incremented iteration count. + */ + num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations); + + /* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal: + * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to + * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end + * of the static snapshot. + * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a + * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need + * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not + * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal + * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item. + */ + if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head || + (snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT && + ++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx)) + *new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID + * @new_state: new algorithm state + * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious + * + * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages + * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds + * the permissible number of messages to send. + */ +static int +ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id, + enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, + bool *is_malvf) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + + if (vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) + return -EIO; + + /* increment the message count in the VF array */ + snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id]++; + + if (snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) + *is_malvf = true; + + /* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */ + ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure + * @snap: pointer to mailbox snapshot structure in the ice_hw struct + * + * Reset the mailbox snapshot structure and clear VF counter array. + */ +static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap) +{ + u32 vfcntr_len; + + if (!snap || !snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) + return; + + /* Clear VF counters. */ + vfcntr_len = snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len; + if (vfcntr_len) + memset(snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr, 0, + (vfcntr_len * sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr))); + + /* Reset mailbox snapshot for a new capture. */ + memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); + snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data + * @vf_id: relative virtual function (VF) ID + * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious + * + * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF + * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state + * transitions of the algorithm: + * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static + * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is + * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is + * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect + * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot + * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that + * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters + * traverse or detect states. + * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate + * through the snapshot without any action on VF. + * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse + * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF. + */ +int +ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, + struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, + bool *is_malvf) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; + struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; + enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; + int status = 0; + + if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data) + return -EINVAL; + + /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF + * is not malicious until detected. + */ + *is_malvf = false; + + /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current + * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold. + */ + if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) + return -EINVAL; + + /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit + * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox + * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the + * mailbox serviced in current interrupt. + */ + if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD || + mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx) + return -EINVAL; + + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; + snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf; + + switch (snap_buf->state) { + case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT: + /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */ + ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap); + + /* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and + * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the + * Mailbox for current interrupt. + */ + snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq; + snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc; + snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx; + + /* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the + * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail + * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot. + */ + snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean + + mbx_data->num_pending_arq); + snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1); + snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail; + + /* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem + * is the difference between the head and tail of the + * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark + * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs. + */ + if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >= + mbx_data->async_watermark_val) { + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; + status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf); + } else { + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; + ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); + } + break; + + case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE: + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; + ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); + break; + + case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT: + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; + status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf); + break; + + default: + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; + status = -EIO; + } + + snap_buf->state = new_state; + + return status; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF + * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits + * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF + * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported + * + * This function will update a bitmap that keeps track of the malicious + * VFs attached to the PF. A malicious VF must be reported only once if + * discovered between VF resets or loading so the function checks + * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been + * detected in any previous mailbox iterations. + */ +int +ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, + u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf) +{ + if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf) + return -EINVAL; + + *report_malvf = false; + + if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) + return -EINVAL; + + if (vf_id >= bitmap_len) + return -EIO; + + /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */ + if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs)) + *report_malvf = true; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF bitmap and counter for VF ID + * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot structure + * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF + * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits + * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF + * + * In case of a VF reset, this function can be called to clear + * the bit corresponding to the VF ID in the bitmap tracking all + * malicious VFs attached to the PF. The function also clears the + * VF counter array at the index of the VF ID. This is to ensure + * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going + * through the overflow detection algorithm. + */ +int +ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, + u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) +{ + if (!snap || !all_malvfs) + return -EINVAL; + + if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */ + if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) + return -EIO; + + /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */ + clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs); + + /* Clear the VF counter in the mailbox snapshot structure for that VF ID. + * This is to ensure that if a VF is unloaded and a new one brought back + * up with the same VF ID for a snapshot currently in traversal or detect + * state the counter for that VF ID does not increment on top of existing + * values in the mailbox overflow detection algorithm. + */ + snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] = 0; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot structure + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * @vf_count: number of VFs allocated on a PF + * + * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and allocate memory + * for the VF counter array based on the number of VFs allocated + * on that PF. + * + * Assumption: This function will assume ice_get_caps() has already been + * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number + * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device. + */ +int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + + /* Ensure that the number of VFs allocated is non-zero and + * is not greater than the number of supported VFs defined in + * the functional capabilities of the PF. + */ + if (!vf_count || vf_count > hw->func_caps.num_allocd_vfs) + return -EINVAL; + + snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vf_count, + sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Setting the VF counter length to the number of allocated + * VFs for given PF's functional capabilities. + */ + snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = vf_count; + + /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the + * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture. + */ + memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); + snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot - Free mailbox snapshot structure + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * + * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and free the VF counter array. + */ +void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + + /* Free VF counter array and reset VF counter length */ + devm_kfree(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr); + snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = 0; + + /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure */ + memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); +} -- cgit v1.2.3