From 5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 18:24:12 -0800 Subject: Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use. - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs. - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers. Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers. - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns. - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on boot. - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan. - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack. - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers. Protocols: - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB). - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range on socket by socket basis. - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used. - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path manager. - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4). - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986). - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters. - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154. - Remove static WEP support. - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate reporting. - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP). BPF: - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure" precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type. - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and timestamp metadata. - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect metadata. - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks. - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and bpf_trace_vprintk helpers. - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case. - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by livepatch and BPF. - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in different time intervals. - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64. - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC. - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs. - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF memory accounting for container environments. Netfilter: - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band /proc interface installed by this target. - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist. Driver API: - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right IRQ affinity on AMD platforms. - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly. - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress. - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA) Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of shared medium Ethernet. - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames. - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET. - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and factor out common parts of netlink operation handling. - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers). - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning messages with notifications for debug. - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct. - Add support for per action HW stats in TC. - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from a specific point in the action chain). - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to using nl80211 interface instead. - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling, including the definition of a new default value that will benefit CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance. New hardware / drivers: - Ethernet: - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver) - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA) - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP) - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux - WiFi: - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu) - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k) - CAN: - Renesas R-Car V4H Drivers: - Bluetooth: - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers. - Ethernet NICs: - Intel (1G, igc): - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model - Intel (100G, ice): - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY - multi-buffer XDP support - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices - nVidia/Mellanox: - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload - more efficient crypto key management method - multi-port eswitch support - Netronome/Corigine: - add DCB IEEE support - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800 - Freescale/NXP (enetc): - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle - support MAC Merge layer - Other NICs: - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100 - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO) - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G - cpts: support pulse-per-second output - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff - tsnep: XDP support - Ethernet high-speed switches: - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw): - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages) - Microchip (sparx5): - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make the implicit rules always active - add support for egress DSCP rewrite - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification) - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS etc.) - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control) - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q, 8.6.5.1) - Ethernet embedded switches: - Marvell (mv88e6xxx): - add MAB (port auth) offload support - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390 - NXP (ocelot): - support MAC Merge layer - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys - Microchip: - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet - other: - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi): - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the BIOS to the firmware. - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k): - IPQ5018 support - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support - channel 177 support - MediaTek WiFi (mt76): - per-PHY LED support - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support - switch to using page pool allocator - RealTek WiFi (rtw89): - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance - Mobile: - rmnet: support TX aggregation" * tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits) page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp(). ... --- mm/kasan/report.c | 586 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 586 insertions(+) create mode 100644 mm/kasan/report.c (limited to 'mm/kasan/report.c') diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22598b20c --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -0,0 +1,586 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * This file contains common KASAN error reporting code. + * + * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. + * Author: Andrey Ryabinin + * + * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by + * Andrey Konovalov + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "kasan.h" +#include "../slab.h" + +static unsigned long kasan_flags; + +#define KASAN_BIT_REPORTED 0 +#define KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT 1 + +enum kasan_arg_fault { + KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT, + KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT, + KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC, +}; + +static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT; + +/* kasan.fault=report/panic */ +static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg) +{ + if (!arg) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(arg, "report")) + kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic")) + kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC; + else + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} +early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault); + +static int __init kasan_set_multi_shot(char *str) +{ + set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags); + return 1; +} +__setup("kasan_multi_shot", kasan_set_multi_shot); + +/* + * Used to suppress reports within kasan_disable/enable_current() critical + * sections, which are used for marking accesses to slab metadata. + */ +static bool report_suppressed(void) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) + if (current->kasan_depth) + return true; +#endif + return false; +} + +/* + * Used to avoid reporting more than one KASAN bug unless kasan_multi_shot + * is enabled. Note that KASAN tests effectively enable kasan_multi_shot + * for their duration. + */ +static bool report_enabled(void) +{ + if (test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags)) + return true; + return !test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_REPORTED, &kasan_flags); +} + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST) + +bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void) +{ + return test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_save_enable_multi_shot); + +void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled) +{ + if (!enabled) + clear_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_restore_multi_shot); + +#endif + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) + +/* + * Whether the KASAN KUnit test suite is currently being executed. + * Updated in kasan_test.c. + */ +static bool kasan_kunit_executing; + +void kasan_kunit_test_suite_start(void) +{ + WRITE_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing, true); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_kunit_test_suite_start); + +void kasan_kunit_test_suite_end(void) +{ + WRITE_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing, false); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_kunit_test_suite_end); + +static bool kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing(void) +{ + return READ_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */ + +static inline bool kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing(void) { return false; } + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */ + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT) + +static void fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(void) +{ + struct kunit *test; + + if (kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing()) + return; + + test = current->kunit_test; + if (test) + kunit_set_failure(test); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_KUNIT */ + +static inline void fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(void) { } + +#endif /* CONFIG_KUNIT */ + +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock); + +static void start_report(unsigned long *flags, bool sync) +{ + fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(); + /* Respect the /proc/sys/kernel/traceoff_on_warning interface. */ + disable_trace_on_warning(); + /* Do not allow LOCKDEP mangling KASAN reports. */ + lockdep_off(); + /* Make sure we don't end up in loop. */ + kasan_disable_current(); + spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags); + pr_err("==================================================================\n"); +} + +static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, void *addr) +{ + if (addr) + trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN, + (unsigned long)addr); + pr_err("==================================================================\n"); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags); + if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags)) + check_panic_on_warn("KASAN"); + if (kasan_arg_fault == KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC) + panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n"); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); + lockdep_on(); + kasan_enable_current(); +} + +static void print_error_description(struct kasan_report_info *info) +{ + pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n", info->bug_type, (void *)info->ip); + + if (info->type != KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS) { + pr_err("Free of addr %px by task %s/%d\n", + info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); + return; + } + + if (info->access_size) + pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n", + info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size, + info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); + else + pr_err("%s at addr %px by task %s/%d\n", + info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", + info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); +} + +static void print_track(struct kasan_track *track, const char *prefix) +{ + pr_err("%s by task %u:\n", prefix, track->pid); + if (track->stack) + stack_depot_print(track->stack); + else + pr_err("(stack is not available)\n"); +} + +static inline struct page *addr_to_page(const void *addr) +{ + if (virt_addr_valid(addr)) + return virt_to_head_page(addr); + return NULL; +} + +static void describe_object_addr(const void *addr, struct kmem_cache *cache, + void *object) +{ + unsigned long access_addr = (unsigned long)addr; + unsigned long object_addr = (unsigned long)object; + const char *rel_type; + int rel_bytes; + + pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the object at %px\n" + " which belongs to the cache %s of size %d\n", + object, cache->name, cache->object_size); + + if (access_addr < object_addr) { + rel_type = "to the left"; + rel_bytes = object_addr - access_addr; + } else if (access_addr >= object_addr + cache->object_size) { + rel_type = "to the right"; + rel_bytes = access_addr - (object_addr + cache->object_size); + } else { + rel_type = "inside"; + rel_bytes = access_addr - object_addr; + } + + pr_err("The buggy address is located %d bytes %s of\n" + " %d-byte region [%px, %px)\n", + rel_bytes, rel_type, cache->object_size, (void *)object_addr, + (void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size)); +} + +static void describe_object_stacks(struct kasan_report_info *info) +{ + if (info->alloc_track.stack) { + print_track(&info->alloc_track, "Allocated"); + pr_err("\n"); + } + + if (info->free_track.stack) { + print_track(&info->free_track, "Freed"); + pr_err("\n"); + } + + kasan_print_aux_stacks(info->cache, info->object); +} + +static void describe_object(const void *addr, struct kasan_report_info *info) +{ + if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled()) + describe_object_stacks(info); + describe_object_addr(addr, info->cache, info->object); +} + +static inline bool kernel_or_module_addr(const void *addr) +{ + if (is_kernel((unsigned long)addr)) + return true; + if (is_module_address((unsigned long)addr)) + return true; + return false; +} + +static inline bool init_task_stack_addr(const void *addr) +{ + return addr >= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack && + (addr <= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack + + sizeof(init_thread_union.stack)); +} + +static void print_address_description(void *addr, u8 tag, + struct kasan_report_info *info) +{ + struct page *page = addr_to_page(addr); + + dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR); + pr_err("\n"); + + if (info->cache && info->object) { + describe_object(addr, info); + pr_err("\n"); + } + + if (kernel_or_module_addr(addr) && !init_task_stack_addr(addr)) { + pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n"); + pr_err(" %pS\n", addr); + pr_err("\n"); + } + + if (object_is_on_stack(addr)) { + /* + * Currently, KASAN supports printing frame information only + * for accesses to the task's own stack. + */ + kasan_print_address_stack_frame(addr); + pr_err("\n"); + } + + if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) { + struct vm_struct *va = find_vm_area(addr); + + if (va) { + pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at\n" + " [%px, %px) created by:\n" + " %pS\n", + va->addr, va->addr + va->size, va->caller); + pr_err("\n"); + + page = vmalloc_to_page(addr); + } + } + + if (page) { + pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n"); + dump_page(page, "kasan: bad access detected"); + pr_err("\n"); + } +} + +static bool meta_row_is_guilty(const void *row, const void *addr) +{ + return (row <= addr) && (addr < row + META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW); +} + +static int meta_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *addr) +{ + /* + * Memory state around the buggy address: + * ff00ff00ff00ff00: 00 00 00 05 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe + * ... + * + * The length of ">ff00ff00ff00ff00: " is + * 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 chars. + * The length of each granule metadata is 2 bytes + * plus 1 byte for space. + */ + return 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 + + (addr - row) / KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * 3 + 1; +} + +static void print_memory_metadata(const void *addr) +{ + int i; + void *row; + + row = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)addr, META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW) + - META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR * META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW; + + pr_err("Memory state around the buggy address:\n"); + + for (i = -META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i <= META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i++) { + char buffer[4 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2]; + char metadata[META_BYTES_PER_ROW]; + + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (i == 0) ? ">%px: " : " %px: ", row); + + /* + * We should not pass a shadow pointer to generic + * function, because generic functions may try to + * access kasan mapping for the passed address. + */ + kasan_metadata_fetch_row(&metadata[0], row); + + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, buffer, + DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, META_BYTES_PER_ROW, 1, + metadata, META_BYTES_PER_ROW, 0); + + if (meta_row_is_guilty(row, addr)) + pr_err("%*c\n", meta_pointer_offset(row, addr), '^'); + + row += META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW; + } +} + +static void print_report(struct kasan_report_info *info) +{ + void *addr = kasan_reset_tag(info->access_addr); + u8 tag = get_tag(info->access_addr); + + print_error_description(info); + if (addr_has_metadata(addr)) + kasan_print_tags(tag, info->first_bad_addr); + pr_err("\n"); + + if (addr_has_metadata(addr)) { + print_address_description(addr, tag, info); + print_memory_metadata(info->first_bad_addr); + } else { + dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR); + } +} + +static void complete_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info) +{ + void *addr = kasan_reset_tag(info->access_addr); + struct slab *slab; + + if (info->type == KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS) + info->first_bad_addr = kasan_find_first_bad_addr( + info->access_addr, info->access_size); + else + info->first_bad_addr = addr; + + slab = kasan_addr_to_slab(addr); + if (slab) { + info->cache = slab->slab_cache; + info->object = nearest_obj(info->cache, slab, addr); + } else + info->cache = info->object = NULL; + + switch (info->type) { + case KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE: + info->bug_type = "invalid-free"; + break; + case KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE: + info->bug_type = "double-free"; + break; + default: + /* bug_type filled in by kasan_complete_mode_report_info. */ + break; + } + + /* Fill in mode-specific report info fields. */ + kasan_complete_mode_report_info(info); +} + +void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *ptr, unsigned long ip, enum kasan_report_type type) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct kasan_report_info info; + + /* + * Do not check report_suppressed(), as an invalid-free cannot be + * caused by accessing slab metadata and thus should not be + * suppressed by kasan_disable/enable_current() critical sections. + */ + if (unlikely(!report_enabled())) + return; + + start_report(&flags, true); + + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + info.type = type; + info.access_addr = ptr; + info.access_size = 0; + info.is_write = false; + info.ip = ip; + + complete_report_info(&info); + + print_report(&info); + + end_report(&flags, ptr); +} + +/* + * kasan_report() is the only reporting function that uses + * user_access_save/restore(): kasan_report_invalid_free() cannot be called + * from a UACCESS region, and kasan_report_async() is not used on x86. + */ +bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, + unsigned long ip) +{ + bool ret = true; + void *ptr = (void *)addr; + unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save(); + unsigned long irq_flags; + struct kasan_report_info info; + + if (unlikely(report_suppressed()) || unlikely(!report_enabled())) { + ret = false; + goto out; + } + + start_report(&irq_flags, true); + + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + info.type = KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS; + info.access_addr = ptr; + info.access_size = size; + info.is_write = is_write; + info.ip = ip; + + complete_report_info(&info); + + print_report(&info); + + end_report(&irq_flags, ptr); + +out: + user_access_restore(ua_flags); + + return ret; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +void kasan_report_async(void) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * Do not check report_suppressed(), as kasan_disable/enable_current() + * critical sections do not affect Hardware Tag-Based KASAN. + */ + if (unlikely(!report_enabled())) + return; + + start_report(&flags, false); + pr_err("BUG: KASAN: invalid-access\n"); + pr_err("Asynchronous fault: no details available\n"); + pr_err("\n"); + dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR); + end_report(&flags, NULL); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE +/* + * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high + * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads + * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the + * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds + * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space. + * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was. + */ +void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) +{ + unsigned long orig_addr; + const char *bug_type; + + if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) + return; + + orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; + /* + * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain + * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access. + * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we + * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow + * chunk of the non-canonical address space. + * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a + * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still + * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not + * necessarily what's actually going on. + */ + if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE) + bug_type = "null-ptr-deref"; + else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE) + bug_type = "probably user-memory-access"; + else + bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access"; + pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type, + orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); +} +#endif -- cgit v1.2.3