From 5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 18:24:12 -0800 Subject: Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use. - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs. - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers. Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers. - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns. - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on boot. - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan. - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack. - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers. Protocols: - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB). - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range on socket by socket basis. - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used. - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path manager. - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4). - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986). - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters. - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154. - Remove static WEP support. - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate reporting. - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP). BPF: - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure" precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type. - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and timestamp metadata. - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect metadata. - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks. - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and bpf_trace_vprintk helpers. - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case. - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by livepatch and BPF. - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in different time intervals. - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64. - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC. - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs. - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF memory accounting for container environments. Netfilter: - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band /proc interface installed by this target. - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist. Driver API: - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right IRQ affinity on AMD platforms. - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly. - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress. - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA) Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of shared medium Ethernet. - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames. - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET. - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and factor out common parts of netlink operation handling. - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers). - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning messages with notifications for debug. - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct. - Add support for per action HW stats in TC. - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from a specific point in the action chain). - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to using nl80211 interface instead. - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling, including the definition of a new default value that will benefit CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance. New hardware / drivers: - Ethernet: - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver) - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA) - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP) - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux - WiFi: - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu) - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k) - CAN: - Renesas R-Car V4H Drivers: - Bluetooth: - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers. - Ethernet NICs: - Intel (1G, igc): - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model - Intel (100G, ice): - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY - multi-buffer XDP support - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices - nVidia/Mellanox: - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload - more efficient crypto key management method - multi-port eswitch support - Netronome/Corigine: - add DCB IEEE support - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800 - Freescale/NXP (enetc): - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle - support MAC Merge layer - Other NICs: - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100 - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO) - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G - cpts: support pulse-per-second output - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff - tsnep: XDP support - Ethernet high-speed switches: - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw): - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages) - Microchip (sparx5): - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make the implicit rules always active - add support for egress DSCP rewrite - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification) - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS etc.) - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control) - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q, 8.6.5.1) - Ethernet embedded switches: - Marvell (mv88e6xxx): - add MAB (port auth) offload support - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390 - NXP (ocelot): - support MAC Merge layer - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys - Microchip: - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet - other: - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi): - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the BIOS to the firmware. - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k): - IPQ5018 support - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support - channel 177 support - MediaTek WiFi (mt76): - per-PHY LED support - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support - switch to using page pool allocator - RealTek WiFi (rtw89): - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance - Mobile: - rmnet: support TX aggregation" * tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits) page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp(). ... --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 596 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 596 insertions(+) create mode 100644 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..483376878 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,596 @@ +/* + * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008 + * The Regents of the University of Michigan + * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + * + * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works + * and redistribute this software and such derivative works + * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of + * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity + * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software + * without specific, written prior authorization. If the + * above copyright notice or any other identification of the + * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any + * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must + * also be included. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION + * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY + * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF + * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE + * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGES. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) +# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH +#endif + +static inline int +gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length) +{ + return blocksize - (length % blocksize); +} + +static inline void +gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize) +{ + int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset); + char *p; + struct kvec *iov; + + if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len) + iov = &buf->tail[0]; + else + iov = &buf->head[0]; + p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len; + iov->iov_len += padding; + buf->len += padding; + memset(p, padding, padding); +} + +static inline int +gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize) +{ + u8 *ptr; + u8 pad; + size_t len = buf->len; + + if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) { + pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1); + if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len) + return -EINVAL; + buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad; + goto out; + } else + len -= buf->head[0].iov_len; + if (len <= buf->page_len) { + unsigned int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1) + >>PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1) + & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last]); + pad = *(ptr + offset); + kunmap_atomic(ptr); + goto out; + } else + len -= buf->page_len; + BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len); + pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1); +out: + /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent + * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need + * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data. + * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless. + * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server + * also uses length and head length together to determine the original + * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's + * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem. + * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and + * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the + * server to attempt to parse the padding. + * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism + * wrap/unwrap functions. */ + if (pad > blocksize) + return -EINVAL; + if (buf->len > pad) + buf->len -= pad; + else + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +void +gss_krb5_make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) +{ + static u64 i = 0; + u64 *q = (u64 *)p; + + /* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really + * necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in + * our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support + * rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt + * already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets + * I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring + * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I + * don't care enough. */ + + /* initialize to random value */ + if (i == 0) { + i = get_random_u32(); + i = (i << 32) | get_random_u32(); + } + + switch (conflen) { + case 16: + *q++ = i++; + fallthrough; + case 8: + *q++ = i++; + break; + default: + BUG(); + } +} + +/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with. + * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace + * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */ +/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface, + * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */ + +/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */ + +static u32 +gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, + struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) +{ + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; + int blocksize = 0, plainlen; + unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; + time64_t now; + int headlen; + struct page **tmp_pages; + u32 seq_send; + u8 *cksumkey; + u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; + + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); + + blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); + gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize); + BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize); + plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset; + + headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) - + (buf->len - offset); + + ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + /* shift data to make room for header. */ + xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen); + + /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */ + BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); + + g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr); + + + /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ + ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); + ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff); + + msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; + + /* + * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE + * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according + * to the RFC. + */ + *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg); + *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg); + ptr[6] = 0xff; + ptr[7] = 0xff; + + gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen); + + if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) + cksumkey = kctx->cksum; + else + cksumkey = NULL; + + /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */ + tmp_pages = buf->pages; + buf->pages = pages; + if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen, + cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + buf->pages = tmp_pages; + + memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); + + seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send); + + /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum + * and encrypt at the same time: */ + if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, + seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, + offset + headlen - conflen, pages)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static u32 +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, + struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, + unsigned int *align) +{ + int signalg; + int sealalg; + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; + time64_t now; + int direction; + s32 seqnum; + unsigned char *ptr; + int bodysize; + void *data_start, *orig_start; + int data_len; + int blocksize; + u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; + int crypt_offset; + u8 *cksumkey; + unsigned int saved_len = buf->len; + + dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n"); + + ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, + len - offset)) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || + (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff))) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ + + /* get the sign and seal algorithms */ + + signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); + if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); + if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + /* + * Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points + * to the beginning of the token header + */ + crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) - + (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base; + + buf->len = len; + if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset)) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) + cksumkey = kctx->cksum; + else + cksumkey = NULL; + + if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset, + cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ + + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); + + if (now > kctx->endtime) + return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; + + /* do sequencing checks */ + + if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || + (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be + * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ + + blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); + data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) + + conflen; + orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; + memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); + buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); + buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start); + + if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + /* slack must include room for krb5 padding */ + *slack = XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len); + /* The GSS blob always precedes the RPC message payload */ + *align = *slack; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need + * to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports + * seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers + * with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass + * without using too much stack space. + * + * If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever + * algorithm. + */ +#define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u + +static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) +{ + char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; + char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned int this_len, i; + + BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN); + + read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift); + for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) { + this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift)); + read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len); + write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len); + } + write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift); +} + +static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) +{ + int shifted = 0; + int this_shift; + + shift %= buf->len; + while (shifted < shift) { + this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN); + rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift); + shifted += this_shift; + } +} + +static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) +{ + struct xdr_buf subbuf; + + xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base); + _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift); +} + +static u32 +gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, + struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) +{ + u8 *ptr; + time64_t now; + u8 flags = 0x00; + __be16 *be16ptr; + __be64 *be64ptr; + u32 err; + + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + + if (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2 == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* make room for gss token header */ + if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* construct gss token header */ + ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff); + *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff); + + if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0) + flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR; + if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0) + flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY; + /* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */ + flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED; + + *ptr++ = flags; + *ptr++ = 0xff; + be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr; + + *be16ptr++ = 0; + /* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */ + *be16ptr++ = 0; + + be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr; + *be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64)); + + err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, pages); + if (err) + return err; + + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); + return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static u32 +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, + struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, + unsigned int *align) +{ + time64_t now; + u8 *ptr; + u8 flags = 0x00; + u16 ec, rrc; + int err; + u32 headskip, tailskip; + u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN]; + unsigned int movelen; + + + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + + if (kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2 == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + + if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + flags = ptr[2]; + if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) || + (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR))) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) { + dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + if (ptr[3] != 0xff) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4)); + rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6)); + + /* + * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss + * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203. + */ + + if (rrc != 0) + rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc); + + err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, len, buf, + &headskip, &tailskip); + if (err) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* + * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify + * it against the original + */ + err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, + len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, + decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6) + || memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) { + dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* do sequencing checks */ + + /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); + if (now > kctx->endtime) + return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; + + /* + * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf. + * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or + * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it. + * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available + * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. + */ + movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); + movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > + buf->head[0].iov_len); + memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); + buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); + + /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ + xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); + + *align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); + *slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +u32 +gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, + struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + + switch (kctx->enctype) { + default: + BUG(); + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages); + } +} + +u32 +gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + + switch (kctx->enctype) { + default: + BUG(); + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf, + &gctx->slack, &gctx->align); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf, + &gctx->slack, &gctx->align); + } +} -- cgit v1.2.3