From 5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 18:24:12 -0800 Subject: Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use. - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs. - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers. Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers. - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns. - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on boot. - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan. - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack. - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers. Protocols: - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB). - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range on socket by socket basis. - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used. - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path manager. - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4). - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986). - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters. - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154. - Remove static WEP support. - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate reporting. - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP). BPF: - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure" precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type. - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and timestamp metadata. - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect metadata. - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks. - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and bpf_trace_vprintk helpers. - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case. - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by livepatch and BPF. - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in different time intervals. - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64. - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC. - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs. - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF memory accounting for container environments. Netfilter: - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band /proc interface installed by this target. - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist. Driver API: - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right IRQ affinity on AMD platforms. - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly. - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress. - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA) Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of shared medium Ethernet. - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames. - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET. - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and factor out common parts of netlink operation handling. - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers). - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning messages with notifications for debug. - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct. - Add support for per action HW stats in TC. - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from a specific point in the action chain). - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to using nl80211 interface instead. - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling, including the definition of a new default value that will benefit CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance. New hardware / drivers: - Ethernet: - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver) - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA) - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP) - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux - WiFi: - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu) - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k) - CAN: - Renesas R-Car V4H Drivers: - Bluetooth: - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers. - Ethernet NICs: - Intel (1G, igc): - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model - Intel (100G, ice): - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY - multi-buffer XDP support - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices - nVidia/Mellanox: - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload - more efficient crypto key management method - multi-port eswitch support - Netronome/Corigine: - add DCB IEEE support - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800 - Freescale/NXP (enetc): - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle - support MAC Merge layer - Other NICs: - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100 - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO) - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G - cpts: support pulse-per-second output - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff - tsnep: XDP support - Ethernet high-speed switches: - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw): - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages) - Microchip (sparx5): - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make the implicit rules always active - add support for egress DSCP rewrite - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification) - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS etc.) - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control) - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q, 8.6.5.1) - Ethernet embedded switches: - Marvell (mv88e6xxx): - add MAB (port auth) offload support - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390 - NXP (ocelot): - support MAC Merge layer - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys - Microchip: - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet - other: - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi): - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the BIOS to the firmware. - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k): - IPQ5018 support - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support - channel 177 support - MediaTek WiFi (mt76): - per-PHY LED support - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support - switch to using page pool allocator - RealTek WiFi (rtw89): - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance - Mobile: - rmnet: support TX aggregation" * tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits) page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp(). ... --- security/selinux/xfrm.c | 473 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 473 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/selinux/xfrm.c (limited to 'security/selinux/xfrm.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c576832fe --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -0,0 +1,473 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module + * + * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations. + * + * Authors: Serge Hallyn + * Trent Jaeger + * + * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala + * + * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. + */ + +/* + * USAGE: + * NOTES: + * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config: + * CONFIG_SECURITY=y + * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y + * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y + * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y + * ISSUES: + * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation + * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines + * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "avc.h" +#include "objsec.h" +#include "xfrm.h" + +/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */ +atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount __read_mostly = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + +/* + * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context. + */ +static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + return (ctx && + (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) && + (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)); +} + +/* + * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux. + */ +static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security); +} + +/* + * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security + * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context. + */ +static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + int rc; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; + u32 str_len; + + if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL || + uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM || + uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) + return -EINVAL; + + str_len = uctx->ctx_len; + if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx = kmalloc(struct_size(ctx, ctx_str, str_len + 1), gfp); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; + ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; + ctx->ctx_len = str_len; + memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len); + ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0'; + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len, + &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp); + if (rc) + goto err; + + rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); + if (rc) + goto err; + + *ctxp = ctx; + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + return 0; + +err: + kfree(ctx); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure. + */ +static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (!ctx) + return; + + atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + kfree(ctx); +} + +/* + * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule. + */ +static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + + if (!ctx) + return 0; + + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, + NULL); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy + * rule. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) +{ + int rc; + + /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable + * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */ + if (!ctx) + return 0; + + /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ + if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL); + return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches + * the given policy, flow combo. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi_common *flic) +{ + u32 state_sid; + u32 flic_sid; + + if (!xp->security) + if (x->security) + /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */ + return 0; + else + /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */ + return 1; + else + if (!x->security) + /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */ + return 0; + else + if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */ + return 0; + + state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; + flic_sid = flic->flowic_secid; + + if (flic_sid != state_sid) + return 0; + + /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA + * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch + * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */ + return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, flic_sid, state_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, + NULL) ? 0 : 1); +} + +static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); + struct xfrm_state *x; + + if (dst == NULL) + return SECSID_NULL; + x = dst->xfrm; + if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return SECSID_NULL; + + return x->security->ctx_sid; +} + +static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; + struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb); + + if (sp) { + int i; + + for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; + if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; + + if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) { + sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid; + if (!ckall) + goto out; + } else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) { + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return -EINVAL; + } + } + } + } + +out: + *sid = sid_session; + return 0; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the + * incoming packet. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + if (skb == NULL) { + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; + } + return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall); +} + +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +{ + int rc; + + rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0); + if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL) + *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new + * for policy cloning. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) +{ + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx; + + if (!old_ctx) + return 0; + + new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, + GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new_ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + *new_ctxp = new_ctx; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information. + */ +void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + selinux_xfrm_free(ctx); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using + * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +{ + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based + * on a secid. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) +{ + int rc; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + char *ctx_str = NULL; + u32 str_len; + + if (!polsec) + return 0; + + if (secid == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str, + &str_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ctx = kmalloc(struct_size(ctx, ctx_str, str_len), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; + ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; + ctx->ctx_sid = secid; + ctx->ctx_len = str_len; + memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len); + + x->security = ctx; + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); +out: + kfree(ctx_str); + return rc; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information. + */ +void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + selinux_xfrm_free(x->security); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security); +} + +/* + * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If + * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was + * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then + * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have + * gone thru the IPSec process. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad) +{ + int i; + struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb); + u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + + if (sp) { + for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { + struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; + + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; + peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + break; + } + } + } + + /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, + * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in + * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + sk_sid, peer_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); +} + +/* + * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing: + * If we have no security association, then we need to determine + * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination. + * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been + * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) +{ + struct dst_entry *dst; + + switch (proto) { + case IPPROTO_AH: + case IPPROTO_ESP: + case IPPROTO_COMP: + /* We should have already seen this packet once before it + * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled + * check. */ + return 0; + default: + break; + } + + dst = skb_dst(skb); + if (dst) { + struct dst_entry *iter; + + for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = xfrm_dst_child(iter)) { + struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm; + + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return 0; + } + } + + /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, + * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in + * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); +} -- cgit v1.2.3