Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextgrafted

Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Core:

   - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having
     to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use.

   - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs.

   - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to
     describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers.
     Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers.

   - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns.

   - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on
     boot.

   - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan.

   - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack.

   - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers.

  Protocols:

   - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB).

   - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range
     on socket by socket basis.

   - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used.

   - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path
     manager.

   - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage
     collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4).

   - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986).

   - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters.

   - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154.

   - Remove static WEP support.

   - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate
     reporting.

   - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP).

  BPF:

   - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure"
     precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using
     kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type.

   - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and
     timestamp metadata.

   - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to
     better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect
     metadata.

   - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks.

   - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and
     bpf_trace_vprintk helpers.

   - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of
     kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case.

   - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by
     livepatch and BPF.

   - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing
     programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in
     different time intervals.

   - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64.

   - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC.

   - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs.

   - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF
     memory accounting for container environments.

  Netfilter:

   - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for
     years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band
     /proc interface installed by this target.

   - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the
     existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the
     referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist.

  Driver API:

   - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right
     IRQ affinity on AMD platforms.

   - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly.

   - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress.

   - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA)
     Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of
     shared medium Ethernet.

   - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing
     preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames.

   - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET.

   - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and
     de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into
     multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and
     factor out common parts of netlink operation handling.

   - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers).

   - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning
     messages with notifications for debug.

   - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct.

   - Add support for per action HW stats in TC.

   - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from
     a specific point in the action chain).

   - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with
     modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless
     Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to
     using nl80211 interface instead.

   - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return
     error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling,
     including the definition of a new default value that will benefit
     CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance.

  New hardware / drivers:

   - Ethernet:
      - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver)
      - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs
      - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY
      - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA)
      - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP)
      - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux

   - WiFi:
      - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu)
      - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k)

   - CAN:
      - Renesas R-Car V4H

  Drivers:

   - Bluetooth:
      - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers.

   - Ethernet NICs:
      - Intel (1G, igc):
         - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model
      - Intel (100G, ice):
         - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY
         - multi-buffer XDP support
         - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices
      - nVidia/Mellanox:
         - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands
         - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control
         - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload
         - more efficient crypto key management method
         - multi-port eswitch support
      - Netronome/Corigine:
         - add DCB IEEE support
         - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800
      - Freescale/NXP (enetc):
         - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers
         - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle
         - support MAC Merge layer
      - Other NICs:
         - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100
         - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO)
         - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA
         - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout
         - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G
         - cpts: support pulse-per-second output
         - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver
         - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing
         - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support
         - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation
         - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP
         - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff
         - tsnep: XDP support

   - Ethernet high-speed switches:
      - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw):
         - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages)
      - Microchip (sparx5):
         - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make
           the implicit rules always active
         - add support for egress DSCP rewrite
         - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification)
         - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS
           etc.)
         - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control)
         - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q,
           8.6.5.1)

   - Ethernet embedded switches:
      - Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
         - add MAB (port auth) offload support
         - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390
      - NXP (ocelot):
         - support MAC Merge layer
         - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys
      - Microchip:
         - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK
         - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics
         - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x
         - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration
         - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet
      - other:
         - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations
         - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy

   - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi):
      - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting
      - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio
        on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the
        BIOS to the firmware.

   - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k):
      - IPQ5018 support
      - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support
      - channel 177 support

   - MediaTek WiFi (mt76):
      - per-PHY LED support
      - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support
      - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support
      - switch to using page pool allocator

   - RealTek WiFi (rtw89):
      - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance

   - Mobile:
      - rmnet: support TX aggregation"

* tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits)
  page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage
  net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation
  ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments
  xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c
  sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal
  selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit
  net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware
  net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance
  net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG
  net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function
  net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension
  net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action
  net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier
  net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action
  net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie
  sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB
  sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings
  net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning
  net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP
  net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp().
  ...

1 files changed, 275 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b1ac5f58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
+			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
+		use_builtin_keys = true;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
+ * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature
+ * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching
+ * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			       const struct key_type *type,
+			       const union key_payload *payload,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!trust_keyring)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+				  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
+				  sig->auth_ids[2], false);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+	else
+		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
+			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
+{
+	return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[0], single) ||
+		asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[1], single));
+}
+
+static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				 const struct key_type *type,
+				 const union key_payload *payload,
+				 struct key *trusted, bool check_dest)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct key *key = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!dest_keyring)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	else if (dest_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!trusted && !check_dest)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (trusted) {
+		if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) {
+			/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+			key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0],
+						  sig->auth_ids[1],
+						  sig->auth_ids[2], false);
+			if (IS_ERR(key))
+				key = NULL;
+		} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
+			const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids;
+
+			signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)
+				asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id;
+
+			/*
+			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the
+			 * one that is being considered for addition to
+			 * dest_keyring) and identify the key that was
+			 * used to sign.
+			 *
+			 * The signer_ids are identifiers for the
+			 * signing key specified for dest_keyring.
+			 *
+			 * The first auth_id is the preferred id, 2nd and
+			 * 3rd are the fallbacks. If exactly one of
+			 * auth_ids[0] and auth_ids[1] is present, it may
+			 * match either signer_ids[0] or signed_ids[1].
+			 * If both are present the first one may match
+			 * either signed_id but the second one must match
+			 * the second signer_id. If neither of them is
+			 * available, auth_ids[2] is matched against
+			 * signer_ids[2] as a fallback.
+			 */
+			if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[2],
+							   sig->auth_ids[2]))
+					key = __key_get(trusted);
+
+			} else if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id;
+
+				auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1];
+				if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id))
+					key = __key_get(trusted);
+
+			} else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[1],
+							  sig->auth_ids[1]) &&
+				   match_either_id(signer_ids,
+						   sig->auth_ids[0])) {
+				key = __key_get(trusted);
+			}
+		} else {
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (check_dest && !key) {
+		/* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0],
+					  sig->auth_ids[1], sig->auth_ids[2],
+					  false);
+		if (IS_ERR(key))
+			key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	ret = key_validate(key);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring - Restrict additions to a ring of public
+ * keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
+ * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
+ * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				    const struct key_type *type,
+				    const union key_payload *payload,
+				    struct key *trusted)
+{
+	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
+				     false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain - Restrict additions to a ring of
+ * public keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter and against the keys already linked to the destination keyring. If
+ * one of those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark
+ * the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
+ * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring,
+					  const struct key_type *type,
+					  const union key_payload *payload,
+					  struct key *trusted)
+{
+	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
+				     true);
+}