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authorLibravatar Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-02-21 18:24:12 -0800
committerLibravatar Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-02-21 18:24:12 -0800
commit5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2 (patch)
treecc5c2d0a898769fd59549594fedb3ee6f84e59a0 /drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
downloadlinux-5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2.tar.gz
linux-5b7c4cabbb65f5c469464da6c5f614cbd7f730f2.zip
Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextgrafted
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use. - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs. - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers. Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers. - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns. - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on boot. - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan. - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack. - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers. Protocols: - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB). - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range on socket by socket basis. - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used. - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path manager. - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4). - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986). - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters. - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154. - Remove static WEP support. - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate reporting. - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP). BPF: - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure" precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type. - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and timestamp metadata. - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect metadata. - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks. - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and bpf_trace_vprintk helpers. - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case. - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by livepatch and BPF. - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in different time intervals. - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64. - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC. - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs. - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF memory accounting for container environments. Netfilter: - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band /proc interface installed by this target. - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist. Driver API: - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right IRQ affinity on AMD platforms. - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly. - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress. - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA) Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of shared medium Ethernet. - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames. - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET. - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and factor out common parts of netlink operation handling. - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers). - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning messages with notifications for debug. - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct. - Add support for per action HW stats in TC. - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from a specific point in the action chain). - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to using nl80211 interface instead. - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling, including the definition of a new default value that will benefit CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance. New hardware / drivers: - Ethernet: - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver) - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA) - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP) - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux - WiFi: - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu) - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k) - CAN: - Renesas R-Car V4H Drivers: - Bluetooth: - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers. - Ethernet NICs: - Intel (1G, igc): - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model - Intel (100G, ice): - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY - multi-buffer XDP support - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices - nVidia/Mellanox: - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload - more efficient crypto key management method - multi-port eswitch support - Netronome/Corigine: - add DCB IEEE support - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800 - Freescale/NXP (enetc): - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle - support MAC Merge layer - Other NICs: - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100 - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO) - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G - cpts: support pulse-per-second output - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff - tsnep: XDP support - Ethernet high-speed switches: - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw): - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages) - Microchip (sparx5): - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make the implicit rules always active - add support for egress DSCP rewrite - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification) - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS etc.) - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control) - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q, 8.6.5.1) - Ethernet embedded switches: - Marvell (mv88e6xxx): - add MAB (port auth) offload support - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390 - NXP (ocelot): - support MAC Merge layer - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys - Microchip: - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet - other: - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi): - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the BIOS to the firmware. - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k): - IPQ5018 support - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support - channel 177 support - MediaTek WiFi (mt76): - per-PHY LED support - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support - switch to using page pool allocator - RealTek WiFi (rtw89): - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance - Mobile: - rmnet: support TX aggregation" * tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits) page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp(). ...
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c603
1 files changed, 603 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c8a248bd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This file houses the main functions for the iSCSI CHAP support
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright 2007-2013 Datera, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <target/iscsi/iscsi_target_core.h>
+#include "iscsi_target_nego.h"
+#include "iscsi_target_auth.h"
+
+static char *chap_get_digest_name(const int digest_type)
+{
+ switch (digest_type) {
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_MD5:
+ return "md5";
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return "sha1";
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return "sha256";
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_SHA3_256:
+ return "sha3-256";
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int chap_gen_challenge(
+ struct iscsit_conn *conn,
+ int caller,
+ char *c_str,
+ unsigned int *c_len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char *challenge_asciihex;
+ struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
+
+ challenge_asciihex = kzalloc(chap->challenge_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!challenge_asciihex)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(chap->challenge, 0, MAX_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
+
+ ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, chap->challenge_len);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ goto out;
+
+ bin2hex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge,
+ chap->challenge_len);
+ /*
+ * Set CHAP_C, and copy the generated challenge into c_str.
+ */
+ *c_len += sprintf(c_str + *c_len, "CHAP_C=0x%s", challenge_asciihex);
+ *c_len += 1;
+
+ pr_debug("[%s] Sending CHAP_C=0x%s\n\n", (caller) ? "server" : "client",
+ challenge_asciihex);
+
+out:
+ kfree(challenge_asciihex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int chap_test_algorithm(const char *name)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return -1;
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int chap_check_algorithm(const char *a_str)
+{
+ char *tmp, *orig, *token, *digest_name;
+ long digest_type;
+ int r = CHAP_DIGEST_UNKNOWN;
+
+ tmp = kstrdup(a_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ pr_err("Memory allocation failed for CHAP_A temporary buffer\n");
+ return CHAP_DIGEST_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ orig = tmp;
+
+ token = strsep(&tmp, "=");
+ if (!token)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (strcmp(token, "CHAP_A")) {
+ pr_err("Unable to locate CHAP_A key\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ while (token) {
+ token = strsep(&tmp, ",");
+ if (!token)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (kstrtol(token, 10, &digest_type))
+ continue;
+
+ digest_name = chap_get_digest_name(digest_type);
+ if (!digest_name)
+ continue;
+
+ pr_debug("Selected %s Algorithm\n", digest_name);
+ if (chap_test_algorithm(digest_name) < 0) {
+ pr_err("failed to allocate %s algo\n", digest_name);
+ } else {
+ r = digest_type;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ kfree(orig);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void chap_close(struct iscsit_conn *conn)
+{
+ kfree(conn->auth_protocol);
+ conn->auth_protocol = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct iscsi_chap *chap_server_open(
+ struct iscsit_conn *conn,
+ struct iscsi_node_auth *auth,
+ const char *a_str,
+ char *aic_str,
+ unsigned int *aic_len)
+{
+ int digest_type;
+ struct iscsi_chap *chap;
+
+ if (!(auth->naf_flags & NAF_USERID_SET) ||
+ !(auth->naf_flags & NAF_PASSWORD_SET)) {
+ pr_err("CHAP user or password not set for"
+ " Initiator ACL\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ conn->auth_protocol = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_chap), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!conn->auth_protocol)
+ return NULL;
+
+ chap = conn->auth_protocol;
+ digest_type = chap_check_algorithm(a_str);
+ switch (digest_type) {
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_MD5:
+ chap->digest_size = MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ chap->digest_size = SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ chap->digest_size = SHA256_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_SHA3_256:
+ chap->digest_size = SHA3_256_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case CHAP_DIGEST_UNKNOWN:
+ default:
+ pr_err("Unsupported CHAP_A value\n");
+ chap_close(conn);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ chap->digest_name = chap_get_digest_name(digest_type);
+
+ /* Tie the challenge length to the digest size */
+ chap->challenge_len = chap->digest_size;
+
+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_A=%d\n", digest_type);
+ *aic_len = sprintf(aic_str, "CHAP_A=%d", digest_type);
+ *aic_len += 1;
+ pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_A=%d\n", digest_type);
+
+ /*
+ * Set Identifier.
+ */
+ chap->id = conn->tpg->tpg_chap_id++;
+ *aic_len += sprintf(aic_str + *aic_len, "CHAP_I=%d", chap->id);
+ *aic_len += 1;
+ pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_I=%d\n", chap->id);
+ /*
+ * Generate Challenge.
+ */
+ if (chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len) < 0) {
+ chap_close(conn);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return chap;
+}
+
+static const char base64_lookup_table[] =
+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+static int chap_base64_decode(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t len)
+{
+ int i, bits = 0, ac = 0;
+ const char *p;
+ u8 *cp = dst;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (src[i] == '=')
+ return cp - dst;
+
+ p = strchr(base64_lookup_table, src[i]);
+ if (p == NULL || src[i] == 0)
+ return -2;
+
+ ac <<= 6;
+ ac += (p - base64_lookup_table);
+ bits += 6;
+ if (bits >= 8) {
+ *cp++ = (ac >> (bits - 8)) & 0xff;
+ ac &= ~(BIT(16) - BIT(bits - 8));
+ bits -= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ac)
+ return -1;
+
+ return cp - dst;
+}
+
+static int chap_server_compute_hash(
+ struct iscsit_conn *conn,
+ struct iscsi_node_auth *auth,
+ char *nr_in_ptr,
+ char *nr_out_ptr,
+ unsigned int *nr_out_len)
+{
+ unsigned long id;
+ unsigned char id_as_uchar;
+ unsigned char type;
+ unsigned char identifier[10], *initiatorchg = NULL;
+ unsigned char *initiatorchg_binhex = NULL;
+ unsigned char *digest = NULL;
+ unsigned char *response = NULL;
+ unsigned char *client_digest = NULL;
+ unsigned char *server_digest = NULL;
+ unsigned char chap_n[MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE], chap_r[MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH];
+ size_t compare_len;
+ struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
+ struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+ int auth_ret = -1, ret, initiatorchg_len;
+
+ digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!digest) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate the digest buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ response = kzalloc(chap->digest_size * 2 + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!response) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate the response buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ client_digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!client_digest) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate the client_digest buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ server_digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!server_digest) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate the server_digest buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memset(identifier, 0, 10);
+ memset(chap_n, 0, MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE);
+ memset(chap_r, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+
+ initiatorchg = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!initiatorchg) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ initiatorchg_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!initiatorchg_binhex) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate initiatorchg_binhex buffer\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Extract CHAP_N.
+ */
+ if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_N", MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE, chap_n,
+ &type) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_N.\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (type == HEX) {
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_N.\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Include the terminating NULL in the compare */
+ compare_len = strlen(auth->userid) + 1;
+ if (strncmp(chap_n, auth->userid, compare_len) != 0) {
+ pr_err("CHAP_N values do not match!\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_N=%s\n", chap_n);
+ /*
+ * Extract CHAP_R.
+ */
+ if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_R", MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH, chap_r,
+ &type) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case HEX:
+ if (strlen(chap_r) != chap->digest_size * 2) {
+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (hex2bin(client_digest, chap_r, chap->digest_size) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R: invalid HEX\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BASE64:
+ if (chap_base64_decode(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)) !=
+ chap->digest_size) {
+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R: invalid BASE64\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_R=%s\n", chap_r);
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(chap->digest_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ tfm = NULL;
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate struct crypto_shash\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate struct shash_desc\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_init() failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &chap->id, 1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for id\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (char *)&auth->password,
+ strlen(auth->password));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for password\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, chap->challenge,
+ chap->challenge_len, server_digest);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for challenge\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ bin2hex(response, server_digest, chap->digest_size);
+ pr_debug("[server] %s Server Digest: %s\n",
+ chap->digest_name, response);
+
+ if (memcmp(server_digest, client_digest, chap->digest_size) != 0) {
+ pr_debug("[server] %s Digests do not match!\n\n",
+ chap->digest_name);
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ pr_debug("[server] %s Digests match, CHAP connection"
+ " successful.\n\n", chap->digest_name);
+ /*
+ * One way authentication has succeeded, return now if mutual
+ * authentication is not enabled.
+ */
+ if (!auth->authenticate_target) {
+ auth_ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Get CHAP_I.
+ */
+ ret = extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_I", 10, identifier, &type);
+ if (ret == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_debug("Could not find CHAP_I. Initiator uses One way authentication.\n");
+ auth_ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_I.\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (type == HEX)
+ ret = kstrtoul(&identifier[2], 0, &id);
+ else
+ ret = kstrtoul(identifier, 0, &id);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("kstrtoul() failed for CHAP identifier: %d\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (id > 255) {
+ pr_err("chap identifier: %lu greater than 255\n", id);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * RFC 1994 says Identifier is no more than octet (8 bits).
+ */
+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_I=%lu\n", id);
+ /*
+ * Get CHAP_C.
+ */
+ if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_C", CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN,
+ initiatorchg, &type) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case HEX:
+ initiatorchg_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(initiatorchg), 2);
+ if (!initiatorchg_len) {
+ pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (initiatorchg_len > 1024) {
+ pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (hex2bin(initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg,
+ initiatorchg_len) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C: invalid HEX\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BASE64:
+ initiatorchg_len = chap_base64_decode(initiatorchg_binhex,
+ initiatorchg,
+ strlen(initiatorchg));
+ if (initiatorchg_len < 0) {
+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C: invalid BASE64\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!initiatorchg_len) {
+ pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (initiatorchg_len > 1024) {
+ pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", initiatorchg);
+ /*
+ * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
+ * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
+ * the target.
+ */
+ if (initiatorchg_len == chap->challenge_len &&
+ !memcmp(initiatorchg_binhex, chap->challenge,
+ initiatorchg_len)) {
+ pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
+ " login attempt\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication.
+ */
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_init() failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* To handle both endiannesses */
+ id_as_uchar = id;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &id_as_uchar, 1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for id\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, auth->password_mutual,
+ strlen(auth->password_mutual));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_update() failed for"
+ " password_mutual\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Convert received challenge to binary hex.
+ */
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg_len,
+ digest);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for ma challenge\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R.
+ */
+ *nr_out_len = sprintf(nr_out_ptr, "CHAP_N=%s", auth->userid_mutual);
+ *nr_out_len += 1;
+ pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_N=%s\n", auth->userid_mutual);
+ /*
+ * Convert response from binary hex to ascii hext.
+ */
+ bin2hex(response, digest, chap->digest_size);
+ *nr_out_len += sprintf(nr_out_ptr + *nr_out_len, "CHAP_R=0x%s",
+ response);
+ *nr_out_len += 1;
+ pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_R=0x%s\n", response);
+ auth_ret = 0;
+out:
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
+ if (tfm)
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kfree(initiatorchg);
+ kfree(initiatorchg_binhex);
+ kfree(digest);
+ kfree(response);
+ kfree(server_digest);
+ kfree(client_digest);
+ return auth_ret;
+}
+
+u32 chap_main_loop(
+ struct iscsit_conn *conn,
+ struct iscsi_node_auth *auth,
+ char *in_text,
+ char *out_text,
+ int *in_len,
+ int *out_len)
+{
+ struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
+
+ if (!chap) {
+ chap = chap_server_open(conn, auth, in_text, out_text, out_len);
+ if (!chap)
+ return 2;
+ chap->chap_state = CHAP_STAGE_SERVER_AIC;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (chap->chap_state == CHAP_STAGE_SERVER_AIC) {
+ convert_null_to_semi(in_text, *in_len);
+ if (chap_server_compute_hash(conn, auth, in_text, out_text,
+ out_len) < 0) {
+ chap_close(conn);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if (auth->authenticate_target)
+ chap->chap_state = CHAP_STAGE_SERVER_NR;
+ else
+ *out_len = 0;
+ chap_close(conn);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 2;
+}