Merge tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextgrafted

Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Core:

   - Add dedicated kmem_cache for typical/small skb->head, avoid having
     to access struct page at kfree time, and improve memory use.

   - Introduce sysctl to set default RPS configuration for new netdevs.

   - Define Netlink protocol specification format which can be used to
     describe messages used by each family and auto-generate parsers.
     Add tools for generating kernel data structures and uAPI headers.

   - Expose all net/core sysctls inside netns.

   - Remove 4s sleep in netpoll if carrier is instantly detected on
     boot.

   - Add configurable limit of MDB entries per port, and port-vlan.

   - Continue populating drop reasons throughout the stack.

   - Retire a handful of legacy Qdiscs and classifiers.

  Protocols:

   - Support IPv4 big TCP (TSO frames larger than 64kB).

   - Add IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE socket option, to control local port range
     on socket by socket basis.

   - Track and report in procfs number of MPTCP sockets used.

   - Support mixing IPv4 and IPv6 flows in the in-kernel MPTCP path
     manager.

   - IPv6: don't check net.ipv6.route.max_size and rely on garbage
     collection to free memory (similarly to IPv4).

   - Support Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) flavor in SRv6 (RFC8986).

   - ICMP: add per-rate limit counters.

   - Add support for user scanning requests in ieee802154.

   - Remove static WEP support.

   - Support minimal Wi-Fi 7 Extremely High Throughput (EHT) rate
     reporting.

   - WiFi 7 EHT channel puncturing support (client & AP).

  BPF:

   - Add a rbtree data structure following the "next-gen data structure"
     precedent set by recently added linked list, that is, by using
     kfunc + kptr instead of adding a new BPF map type.

   - Expose XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and
     timestamp metadata.

   - Add BPF_F_NO_TUNNEL_KEY extension to bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key to
     better support decap on GRE tunnel devices not operating in collect
     metadata.

   - Improve x86 JIT's codegen for PROBE_MEM runtime error checks.

   - Remove the need for trace_printk_lock for bpf_trace_printk and
     bpf_trace_vprintk helpers.

   - Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of
     kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case.

   - Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by
     livepatch and BPF.

   - Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing
     programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs in
     different time intervals.

   - Add support for BPF trampoline on s390x and riscv64.

   - Add capability to export the XDP features supported by the NIC.

   - Add __bpf_kfunc tag for marking kernel functions as kfuncs.

   - Add cgroup.memory=nobpf kernel parameter option to disable BPF
     memory accounting for container environments.

  Netfilter:

   - Remove the CLUSTERIP target. It has been marked as obsolete for
     years, and we still have WARN splats wrt races of the out-of-band
     /proc interface installed by this target.

   - Add 'destroy' commands to nf_tables. They are identical to the
     existing 'delete' commands, but do not return an error if the
     referenced object (set, chain, rule...) did not exist.

  Driver API:

   - Improve cpumask_local_spread() locality to help NICs set the right
     IRQ affinity on AMD platforms.

   - Separate C22 and C45 MDIO bus transactions more clearly.

   - Introduce new DCB table to control DSCP rewrite on egress.

   - Support configuration of Physical Layer Collision Avoidance (PLCA)
     Reconciliation Sublayer (RS) (802.3cg-2019). Modern version of
     shared medium Ethernet.

   - Support for MAC Merge layer (IEEE 802.3-2018 clause 99). Allowing
     preemption of low priority frames by high priority frames.

   - Add support for controlling MACSec offload using netlink SET.

   - Rework devlink instance refcounts to allow registration and
     de-registration under the instance lock. Split the code into
     multiple files, drop some of the unnecessarily granular locks and
     factor out common parts of netlink operation handling.

   - Add TX frame aggregation parameters (for USB drivers).

   - Add a new attr TCA_EXT_WARN_MSG to report TC (offload) warning
     messages with notifications for debug.

   - Allow offloading of UDP NEW connections via act_ct.

   - Add support for per action HW stats in TC.

   - Support hardware miss to TC action (continue processing in SW from
     a specific point in the action chain).

   - Warn if old Wireless Extension user space interface is used with
     modern cfg80211/mac80211 drivers. Do not support Wireless
     Extensions for Wi-Fi 7 devices at all. Everyone should switch to
     using nl80211 interface instead.

   - Improve the CAN bit timing configuration. Use extack to return
     error messages directly to user space, update the SJW handling,
     including the definition of a new default value that will benefit
     CAN-FD controllers, by increasing their oscillator tolerance.

  New hardware / drivers:

   - Ethernet:
      - nVidia BlueField-3 support (control traffic driver)
      - Ethernet support for imx93 SoCs
      - Motorcomm yt8531 gigabit Ethernet PHY
      - onsemi NCN26000 10BASE-T1S PHY (with support for PLCA)
      - Microchip LAN8841 PHY (incl. cable diagnostics and PTP)
      - Amlogic gxl MDIO mux

   - WiFi:
      - RealTek RTL8188EU (rtl8xxxu)
      - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices (ath12k)

   - CAN:
      - Renesas R-Car V4H

  Drivers:

   - Bluetooth:
      - Set Per Platform Antenna Gain (PPAG) for Intel controllers.

   - Ethernet NICs:
      - Intel (1G, igc):
         - support TSN / Qbv / packet scheduling features of i226 model
      - Intel (100G, ice):
         - use GNSS subsystem instead of TTY
         - multi-buffer XDP support
         - extend support for GPIO pins to E823 devices
      - nVidia/Mellanox:
         - update the shared buffer configuration on PFC commands
         - implement PTP adjphase function for HW offset control
         - TC support for Geneve and GRE with VF tunnel offload
         - more efficient crypto key management method
         - multi-port eswitch support
      - Netronome/Corigine:
         - add DCB IEEE support
         - support IPsec offloading for NFP3800
      - Freescale/NXP (enetc):
         - support XDP_REDIRECT for XDP non-linear buffers
         - improve reconfig, avoid link flap and waiting for idle
         - support MAC Merge layer
      - Other NICs:
         - sfc/ef100: add basic devlink support for ef100
         - ionic: rx_push mode operation (writing descriptors via MMIO)
         - bnxt: use the auxiliary bus abstraction for RDMA
         - r8169: disable ASPM and reset bus in case of tx timeout
         - cpsw: support QSGMII mode for J721e CPSW9G
         - cpts: support pulse-per-second output
         - ngbe: add an mdio bus driver
         - usbnet: optimize usbnet_bh() by avoiding unnecessary queuing
         - r8152: handle devices with FW with NCM support
         - amd-xgbe: support 10Mbps, 2.5GbE speeds and rx-adaptation
         - virtio-net: support multi buffer XDP
         - virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff
         - tsnep: XDP support

   - Ethernet high-speed switches:
      - nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw):
         - add support for latency TLV (in FW control messages)
      - Microchip (sparx5):
         - separate explicit and implicit traffic forwarding rules, make
           the implicit rules always active
         - add support for egress DSCP rewrite
         - IS0 VCAP support (Ingress Classification)
         - IS2 VCAP filters (protos, L3 addrs, L4 ports, flags, ToS
           etc.)
         - ES2 VCAP support (Egress Access Control)
         - support for Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (802.1Q,
           8.6.5.1)

   - Ethernet embedded switches:
      - Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
         - add MAB (port auth) offload support
         - enable PTP receive for mv88e6390
      - NXP (ocelot):
         - support MAC Merge layer
         - support for the the vsc7512 internal copper phys
      - Microchip:
         - lan9303: convert to PHYLINK
         - lan966x: support TC flower filter statistics
         - lan937x: PTP support for KSZ9563/KSZ8563 and LAN937x
         - lan937x: support Credit Based Shaper configuration
         - ksz9477: support Energy Efficient Ethernet
      - other:
         - qca8k: convert to regmap read/write API, use bulk operations
         - rswitch: Improve TX timestamp accuracy

   - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi):
      - EHT (Wi-Fi 7) rate reporting
      - STEP equalizer support: transfer some STEP (connection to radio
        on platforms with integrated wifi) related parameters from the
        BIOS to the firmware.

   - Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k):
      - IPQ5018 support
      - Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) responder role support
      - channel 177 support

   - MediaTek WiFi (mt76):
      - per-PHY LED support
      - mt7996: EHT (Wi-Fi 7) support
      - Wireless Ethernet Dispatch (WED) reset support
      - switch to using page pool allocator

   - RealTek WiFi (rtw89):
      - support new version of Bluetooth co-existance

   - Mobile:
      - rmnet: support TX aggregation"

* tag 'net-next-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1872 commits)
  page_pool: add a comment explaining the fragment counter usage
  net: ethtool: fix __ethtool_dev_mm_supported() implementation
  ethtool: pse-pd: Fix double word in comments
  xsk: add linux/vmalloc.h to xsk.c
  sefltests: netdevsim: wait for devlink instance after netns removal
  selftest: fib_tests: Always cleanup before exit
  net/mlx5e: Align IPsec ASO result memory to be as required by hardware
  net/mlx5e: TC, Set CT miss to the specific ct action instance
  net/mlx5e: Rename CHAIN_TO_REG to MAPPED_OBJ_TO_REG
  net/mlx5: Refactor tc miss handling to a single function
  net/mlx5: Kconfig: Make tc offload depend on tc skb extension
  net/sched: flower: Support hardware miss to tc action
  net/sched: flower: Move filter handle initialization earlier
  net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action
  net/sched: Rename user cookie and act cookie
  sfc: fix builds without CONFIG_RTC_LIB
  sfc: clean up some inconsistent indentings
  net/mlx4_en: Introduce flexible array to silence overflow warning
  net: lan966x: Fix possible deadlock inside PTP
  net/ulp: Remove redundant ->clone() test in inet_clone_ulp().
  ...

1 files changed, 936 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf24c5255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,936 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_main.c
+ *	implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
+ *	evm_inode_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_inode_set_acl.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+int evm_initialized;
+
+static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
+	"pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label",
+	"no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
+int evm_hmac_attrs;
+
+static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+	 .enabled = true
+	},
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
+
+static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init;
+static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
+{
+	if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
+		evm_fixmode = 1;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
+
+static void __init evm_init_config(void)
+{
+	int i, xattrs;
+
+	xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames);
+
+	pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n");
+	for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) {
+		pr_info("%s%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name,
+			!evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].enabled ?
+			" (disabled)" : "");
+		list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list,
+			      &evm_config_xattrnames);
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
+#endif
+	pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
+}
+
+static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
+{
+	return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification
+ * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key
+ * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the
+ * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the
+ * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid.
+ */
+static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void)
+{
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	int error;
+	int count = 0;
+
+	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (error < 0) {
+			if (error == -ENODATA)
+				continue;
+			return error;
+		}
+		count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
+ *
+ * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
+ * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
+ *
+ * For performance:
+ * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
+ *   HMAC.)
+ * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
+ *
+ * Returns integrity status
+ */
+static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *xattr_name,
+					     char *xattr_value,
+					     size_t xattr_value_len,
+					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	struct evm_digest digest;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
+
+	if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
+		     iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
+		return iint->evm_status;
+
+	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
+
+	/* first need to know the sig type */
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0) {
+		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		if (rc == -ENODATA) {
+			rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
+			if (rc > 0)
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+			else if (rc == 0)
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
+		} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	xattr_len = rc;
+
+	/* check value type */
+	switch (xattr_data->type) {
+	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len, &digest);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest,
+				   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+		evm_immutable = 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		/* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
+		if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
+		digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
+		rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
+					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
+					digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
+		if (!rc) {
+			inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+			if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+				if (iint)
+					iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
+			} else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
+				   !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
+				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
+				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+						    xattr_value,
+						    xattr_value_len);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS;
+		else if (evm_immutable)
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE;
+		else
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+	}
+	pr_debug("digest: (%d) [%*phN]\n", digest.hdr.length, digest.hdr.length,
+		  digest.digest);
+out:
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = evm_status;
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return evm_status;
+}
+
+static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
+				      bool all_xattrs)
+{
+	int namelen;
+	int found = 0;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+
+	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
+		    && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
+			    xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
+			    strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+{
+	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
+}
+
+int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name)
+{
+	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values
+ * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs
+ * @inode: inode of the read xattrs
+ * @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ * @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values
+ * @canonical_fmt: data format (true: little endian, false: native format)
+ *
+ * Read protected xattr names (separated by |), lengths (u32) or values for a
+ * given dentry and return the total size of copied data. If buffer is NULL,
+ * just return the total size.
+ *
+ * Returns the total size on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
+			      int buffer_size, char type, bool canonical_fmt)
+{
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	int rc, size, total_size = 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0 && rc == -ENODATA)
+			continue;
+		else if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case 'n':
+			size = strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+			if (buffer) {
+				if (total_size)
+					*(buffer + total_size - 1) = '|';
+
+				memcpy(buffer + total_size, xattr->name, size);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			size = sizeof(u32);
+			if (buffer) {
+				if (canonical_fmt)
+					rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc);
+
+				*(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			size = rc;
+			if (buffer) {
+				rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry,
+					d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name,
+					buffer + total_size,
+					buffer_size - total_size);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					return rc;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		total_size += size;
+	}
+
+	return total_size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
+ * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ *
+ * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
+ * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
+ * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
+ *
+ * Returns the xattr integrity status.
+ *
+ * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
+ * is executed.
+ */
+enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				      const char *xattr_name,
+				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
+				      struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	if (!iint) {
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (!iint)
+			return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len, iint);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
+
+/*
+ * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
+ * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
+ */
+static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
+		return INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ *
+ * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int evm_xattr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			    const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	char *xattr_data = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data,
+				0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		rc = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == xattr_value_len)
+		rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc);
+	else
+		rc = 1;
+
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ *
+ * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
+ * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
+ *
+ * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
+ * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
+ * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
+ * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
+ * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
+ */
+static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			     struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+	} else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
+		if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
+			return 0;
+		evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+			return 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+		/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+		if (evm_hmac_disabled())
+			return 0;
+
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
+		if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
+		    || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
+			return 0;
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
+				    dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
+				    "update_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	}
+out:
+	/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+	if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	    evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+	 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_xattr_change(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+			      xattr_value_len))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS &&
+	    evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ *
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
+ */
+int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+		       size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!xattr_value_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+		    xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	return evm_protect_xattr(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
+ * the current value is valid.
+ */
+int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	return evm_protect_xattr(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				    struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	umode_t mode;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (!kacl)
+		return 1;
+
+	rc = posix_acl_update_mode(idmap, inode, &mode, &kacl);
+	if (rc || (inode->i_mode != mode))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					   struct dentry *dentry,
+					   const char *name,
+					   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ */
+int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+	if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	    evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+	 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_inode_set_acl_change(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the
+ * EVM status.
+ *
+ * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	if (!evm_key_loaded())
+		return false;
+
+	/* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */
+	if (!xattr_name)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) &&
+	    strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ *
+ * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
+ * i_mutex lock.
+ */
+void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
+ */
+void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+
+	if (!i_uid_needs_update(idmap, attr, inode) &&
+	    !i_gid_needs_update(idmap, attr, inode) &&
+	    (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
+ * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
+ */
+int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		      struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
+		return 0;
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	/*
+	 * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
+	 * are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) ||
+	    (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	     evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_attr_change(idmap, dentry, attr))
+		return 0;
+
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+			    integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
+ *
+ * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
+ * changes.
+ *
+ * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
+ * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
+ */
+void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
+		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
+ */
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
+				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+{
+	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
+	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+		return 0;
+
+	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!xattr_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
+	evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
+	evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
+void __init evm_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
+	if (!rc)
+		evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int __init init_evm(void)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct list_head *pos, *q;
+
+	evm_init_config();
+
+	error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	error = evm_init_secfs();
+	if (error < 0) {
+		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+error:
+	if (error != 0) {
+		if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
+			list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames)
+				list_del(pos);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_evm);